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APPLYING THE '"'"PARADOX1'T'IIEORY: A LAW AND 
POLICY ANALYSIS OP COLLECriVE BARGAINING 
RIGI ITS AND TEACHER EVALUATION REPORM t:-:ROM 
SEI~ECTED STATES 
Mark Paige, ].D., Ph.D.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 20 II, swtc legislatures across the country passed sweeping 
~1mcndmcnts to their collective bargaining statutes. Many aftcctcd the 
rights of unions to bargain over personnel issues, such ~1s teacher 
evaluations. In bet, in three of the f(mr states analyzed in this Article, 
local unions ~md management arc essentially prohibited from 
bargaining on the process and substance of teacher evaluations. At 
the same time, state bureaucracies have stepped in and increased their 
control over teacher evaluations. Restricting union involvement at 
the bargaining table is viewed as one way to ensure that school 
boards and not unions control public education. In theory, these 
changes promote democracy by incrc~1sing the power of elected 
representatives while reducing the impact of unclectcd unions. 
These st~nutory changes arc ripe for research. Indeed, scholarship 
has yet to address the issue of bargaining teacher evaluations in the 
context of the recent statutory amendments. This Article analyzes 
rd(mllS to legislative changes concerning the process and substance 
of teacher evaluations through a law and policy analysis. In hct, this 
Article argues that excluding unions from teacher evaluations in 
collective bargaining negotiations will actually have the unintended 
consequence of impeding rd(m11S and change. This is the paradox; 
theoretically, if management has exclusive control over teacher 
evaluations, it can implement rd(mns with case, but bccmsc unions 
arc excluded from negotiating evaluations, they will f(xus their 
resources on disrupting rather than supporting change. 
Consequently, this Article proposes a two-tiered solution. Pirst, 
statutes should permit districts to bargain teacher evaluations. 
Second, the usc of interest-based bargaining ("IBB") should be 
• Assistant l'rotl-ssor, Department of Educ1tional Leadership, Univcrsit\' of Mc!ssaehuserrs-
lhrtmouth; Adjunct l'rokssor, University of ,\1assc!Chusetts School of Law, The clllthor would 
like to thank Julie Mead, Todd DCJ'vlitchel1, Marrin Malin, and Bruce J'vlcredith lrlr reading 
ecnlicr n-rsions of this Article 
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encouraged at the local district level as the preferred negotiation 
process. I BB encourages collaboration between management and 
unions on a local level, invests teachers in the process, and, thcrd()rc, 
increases the probability that changes will be dtcctively implemented 
within schools. 
This Article is org~mizcd as f()llows. Part II highlights the existing 
literature concerning collective bargaining in education. It concludes 
with a discussion of the "paradox" theory, the conceptual lens applied 
to the issuc. 1 The paradox theory suggests that excluding unions 
from policy matters impedes rather than promotes education rd(m11 
initiatives and dlcctivc school govcrnancc.2 Instead, an ~1ppropriatc 
legal framework governing teacher evaluations and collective 
bargaining would promote collaboration through the f(m11al 
barg~1ining process. Part III examines selected legislative changes in 
teacher cvalu<ltions from f(mr states: Wisconsin, florida, Michigan, 
and New Hampshire. In all but New Hampshire, these changes 
encourage the paradox because bargaining teacher cvalu~1tions is now 
prohibited. Thus P~1rt IV recommends a two-tiered approach to 
avoid the paradox as it relates to teacher evaluations. Lastly, Part V 
concludes by summarizing key points and advising legislators how to 
avoid the collective bargaining paradox. 
II. A REVIEW Of RELEVANT LITERATURE CONCERNING UNIONS 
AND EDUCATION: THE Goon, THE BAn, AND TilE PARADOXICAL 
This section presents the two general arguments concerning 
collective bargaining in public education. On the one hand, scholars 
opposed to collective bargaining and unions argue that they arc 
costly and antidemocratic. 3 On the other hand, some suggest that 
unions ~1rc vehicles for education rd(m11. 4 Additionally, this section 
will discuss the classification system used by courts and legislatures to 
ddinc each party's bargaining obligations and elaborate on the 
paradox of public sector labor law. s 
I. Martin H. Malin, The I';Inl<fox oFI'uh!ic Sector /.;~/>or /.;IW, ll4 biD. L.j. 1369 
(2009). 
2. /datl370. 
3. !d at 131l4. 
4. !d. at 1390-9 J. 
S. Malin, supr;~notc I. 
lj APPLYING THE "PARADOX" THEORY 
A. Tead1cr Unions: Cost{v Impediments to Rcfimn 
Opponents to collective bargaining in education protfcr a 
number of arguments. Collective bargaining is expensive because 
unions attempt to obtain the highest possible wages and bcndits t(>r 
their mcmbcrs.6 Consequently, districts become trapped in costly 
compensation packages.? Salary schcduks-typiolly part of a 
collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") -arc structured so that 
teachers arc rewarded t(>r seniority, without regard to merit in most 
cascs.l' Moreover, public sector employees enjoy costly pension and 
health insur~1ncc plans, generally borne by the districts. <J These costs 
arc created through CBAs. 
Opponents also argue that collective b~1rgaining impedes effective 
nunagement of schools. 1 ° CBAs hamstring school ~1dministrators 
attempting to man~1gc schools.! I for example, the length of a 
teacher's school day is determined to the minute by the terms of the 
CBA.I2 Administrators who attempt to extend the school day t(>r an 
occasi01ul event outside of typical school hours (e.g., "family Math 
Night") without compensation do so at the peril of a grievance. 
Regardless, the argument is that CBAs-a product of negotiations-
impede day-to-day school management. 
Unions ~1rc criticized as obstacles to improving teacher quality 
because they negotiate contracts that protect incompetent teachers 
and sacrifice younger, talented ones. So-called "bumping" rights and 
"Reduction in force" ("RIF') clauses arc commonly cited as 
impeding teacher quality. 13 U ndcr these provisionS: seniority 
determines the order of pcrsonncllayoHs, preserving the employment 
6. Lab Carr Stedman ct ;11., J)o Teacher Unions 11!/](/cr Fducwima/ l'crfimn;lna·' 
rcssons rcuncd limn the State SAT :md ACT Score,·, 70 HARV. Enuc. REV. 437, 441 
( 2000) (noting that opponents of union involvement in cduution view unions .1s "problem:ltic 
beuuse they arc singularly interested in maximizing working conditions and compensation 
rather tlun, and ;lt the possible expense ot~ studem gains"). 
7. Sec. e.g, LORR1\INE M. McDONNFLL & ANTIIONY PASCAL, TFMIIER U:--:1o:--:s 
.\Nil EDL!C\TION REHlRM (Rand l<JRX). 
X. Steelman ct al., supra note 6, at 442. 
<J. .~i.·c Christopher Edwards, l'uhlic .~(·am· Uwims and the Risiii,t; 0Jstl· oFhnpkwcc 
C!Hnpmsation, 30 CAro ). I, R7 (Winter 2010). 
I 0. Stedman ct al., supra note 6, :lt 441. 
II. !d 
12. Malin, supr:1notc I, at 13<JO. 
13. .~(·c, c.,~.;., Ev:1 Moskowitz, Rrc:1kdown, 6 Fnuc. NEXT (Summer 2006) (t:li<ing issue 
with the length :1nd various provisions in contr:lcts :1nd accusing m:1nagcmcnt <llld labor of 
"colluding" to pllt :1dult interests over those ofchildrm). 
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of some of the older teachers who may have become ineffective. 
Consequently, the newest teachers-the future of the district-arc 
the first to be laid off. 14 Again, this appears irrational; effectiveness is 
not a flctor in the employment decision.! S In sum, labyrinthine 
CBAs strangle sound education policy that would otherwise be 
implemented by well-intended school administrators.I6 Several 
scholars argue that these dlccts result in poor student outcomcs.I7 
Others argue that public sector collective bargaining is anti-
democratic, as a discrete minority-unions ~md teachers-can 
influence an elected public entity. Unions can leverage political 
pressure on elected school board otlicials, especially if they ted 
slighted at the bargaining table. This sets an ominous backdrop to 
any negotiation session; the implicit threat of revenge at the ballot 
box by a powcrf\Jl interest group may push elected school board 
members to f()ld on a particular issue. Moreover, this is an advantage 
not otherwise available to private sector employces.IX Thus, a 
minority essentially manages a public asset (public schools) meant f()l· 
control by the majority. 
B. The Other Side o{the Coin: Unions as Rcfhnnen· 
In contrast, some scholars view collective bargaining and unions 
fworably. Their art,rtrmcnts arc two-f()ld. first, unions improve 
working conditions, and second, teachers advance education rdcm11 
through barg~1ining. Both lines of thought imply that the promotion 
of teachers' self--interests complements students' best interests.I9 
first, unions create conducive workplace environments that, in 
turn, benefit stlldcnts.20 for example, when teachers arc not required 
14. lmkcd, the colloquialism <lssociatcd with this dkct is "The last hired is the first 
tired." 
IS. Steelman ct ell., supra note 6, at 442. 
16. Setting aside the academic point, some of these arguments tlut criticize lahvrinthinc 
CBAs arc somewhat awkward, as CBAs arc the product of f1(gon:ltions between two parties. In 
other words, management agrees to the terms of the CBA. 
17. Steelman ct <li., supra note 6, at 442 (citing various scholars who criticize unions on 
rhis score). 
I X. Benjamin 1.indv, The Impact of" Tcxhcr Collective /J;ug;zimizg Lm~,· on Student 
A,-hi<·l·,·mcnt: Fvidcncc 
fi"om a New ,\kxiw Nztw:z/ h;pcninmt, 120 Yi\LF.l..). 1130, 1141 (2010). 
19. Stcelm<lll et <li., supra note 6, at 442 (summarizing proponents' arguments <ls 
!(,]lows: "Taken together, these possible lx·ndits of unions may enhance not onlv the status of 
teachers but also the cducltimul climate to which students arc exposed."). 
20. !d. (noting the <lrgument that "[ b [etter pw and more secure working conditions 
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to be bus monitors or arc given duty-free lunch breaks, they can 
devote more energy and time to instructional activities. 21 In this way, 
unions permit tc~Khers to improve their teaching, rather than deal 
with tangential, "noneducational tasks. "22 Thus, improving working 
conditions may improve schools. 23 
Second, some argue that unions arc engines of innov~1tion. 24 
Summ~1rizing this point, one scholar noted that unions have 
barg~1incd f(>r "mentor programs, peer review procedures, higher 
academic standards, I and I a longer school year," among other 
things. 2S Moreover, unions can be dkctivc conduits f(>r policy 
rd(m11, such as in-school financc. 26 Thcrd(>rc, unions add rd(xm 
mechanisms that might otherwise be ignored if teachers were not 
able to ~Kt as advocates in the negotiation process through union 
representation. 
C Resolving the Good and Bad: Third-Par~v Adjudication 
The appropriate role of unions in education is contested in reality 
and not just in ~Kadcmic debates. Courts, administrative boards, and 
legislatures arc repeatedly asked to draw the boundary between the 
collective bargaining rights of teachers and the right of the public to 
run schools through duly elected oflicials. 27 The essential question 
these bodies must resolve is whether or not certain subjects (e.g., 
teacher evaluations) arc exclusively management prerogatives and, in 
llla\' attLlCt higher quality tecKhers cllld filster a .sundard of prokssionalism that is conducive to 
dkctive te,Khing") (citations omitted). 
21, Linch·, SlljJJ:J note IX, clt 1143 (summclrizing various scholars tilr the general 
c1rgument that improving teacher working conditions improves educatiotul qtulitv) ( citcnions 
omitted). 
22. 5/:c, e,g, Brian Rowan n aL, lhii1g Resec1rch on 1:/nplm·ces' l'crfimn:Jnce ro Studt· 
the Ffkct of' 7£·xhen on Srudmts·' Achievemmt, 70 Soc Of' Enuc, 2S6 (I YY7) (work 
situcnion is one bctor that affects teacher perfimnance). 
23. !d 
24. Steelman et aL, supr;~ note 6, at 442 ("Unions also may encourage more proficient 
nutugenKnt cllld 'shock' the svsrem into needed restructuring"). Hut sec :Jim TO!lll A. 
DFJ'v!JTCI I ELL, LABOR RELATIONS IN ElllJCi\TIO:c.J: l'OLICIES, !'Ol.I'l'I(:S, Al\ll I'Ri\CTICES YO 
(2010) (bc1rgaining rdim11 at the table has a mixed record of success) . . ke :1/m Limh·, SlljJJ:J 
note I X, at 1143-44. 
2S. Lindv, supr:Jnote I X, at 1143. 
26. .~(·c, e.g., Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 3RR (Wis. 2000) (school fin:lllce 
challenge where Wisconsin\ largest teacher union, WEAC, intervened as a plaintiff profkring a 
number of arguments ultimately adopted hv the Supreme Court in a narrow decision). 
27. .~(·c. e.g., Malin, supi:Jnote I, at 13R4-13Yl (a review of court cases concerning this 
issue with varving decisions). 
26 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [20 1 ~3 
turn, excluded from bargaining. 2X Is the subject related primarily to 
employee working conditions and, therctixc, required to be 
bargained? Or docs the subject hll somewhere in between? These arc 
not easy questions. liT Chicago- Kent College of Law ProtCssor 
Martin M~1lin notes the complicated nan1re of the inquiry: "The 
problem that labor bo~1rds and courts have had to confront is how to 
deal with two potentially extremely broad concepts. At some level, 
every decision aflccts conditions of employment, and, at some level, 
every decision affects public policy or managerial authority. " 2'> 
Courts employ a classification system to resolve these disputes. A 
subject's classification determines the parties' obligation, if any, to 
bargain it. A subject, and its subparts, can be classified as follows: 
nunda tory, permissive, or prohibited. 30 A mandatory subject is one 
that primarily relates to employee working conditions. It must be 
bargained. A permissive subject is one that docs not primarily relate 
to employee working conditions and is not exclusively reserved to 
management. It may be bargained. A prohibited subject is one that is 
exclusively reserved to management because it relates to 
management's control over schools. It cannot be bargained, even if 
both sides desire it. As discussed, teacher evaluations arc now 
prohibited under amendments to education and bargaining statutes 
in several of the states profiled in this Article. 
l Iowcvcr, a prohibited subject is not necessarily immune from 
union int1uencc due to impact bargaining, by which unions can 
negotiate the ctkct of a policy on employee "terms and working 
conditions. "31 Thus, to the extent that an issue (e.g., the process of 
teacher evaluations) impacts "terms and working conditions," it is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.32 ~or example, some courts have 
held that the length of a school day is not a mandatory subject of 
2X. Bargaining rights of public employees arc generally creatures of statutes. In stcltes 
where permitted, legislatures have enacted public sector labor laws tlut gencrc1lly require a 
public entity to bargc1in "terms and conditions of employment." Sec, e.g., N.H. REV. ST.\T. 
AN~. § 273-A:3(I) (20 11 ). 
2'>. Mellin, supra note I, at 13X5. 
30. ld ("I M lost jurisdictions t(>llow the private sector model of dividing subjects of 
bargaining into mandatory, permissive, and prohibited."). ,\(·c ;Jlm Martin H. Malin & Charles 
Tn·lor Kerchner, Clurrcr School1· ;uu! C!J//cctivc Harg;u/u!J!{: Onnp;Jtihlc ,'vf;un:Jgc or 
11/c,!{itim;Jtc R.duion.1hip!, 30 I L\R V. J. L. PUB. Pol :y XXS, <) 13-<J 14 ( 2007). 
31. .kc, e.g., Malin, sup1:1 note 1, at 13<)0 (noting that unions t(>uJs on impclct 
barg.1ining as a means to "insulate" its employees ti·om policies that ,Ire impkmcntni without 
negoticltions). 
32. ld 
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bargaining because it is a matter of educational policy.33 I Iowcvcr, 
the extended hours of work directly impact a teacher's "terms and 
conditions of employment, "34 and so the exact hours and the 
compensation associated with the proposal arc mandatory subjects of 
b~1rgaining. In sum, through imp~1ct bargaining, unions maintain 
important leverage over a policy implementation even if the policy 1s 
classified as prohibited by statute. 35 
In New I lampshirc, the subject of teacher evaluations is at least 
pcrmissivc. 37 Other examples highlight the variation between states 
on the same issue. 3X Regardless, when a third party rules a subject 
prohibited, it typically cites "democratic" concerns. 3<> In other words, 
the issue's relationship to the function of the public entity outweighs 
considerations of the rights of the public worker. It would be 
undemocratic to permit union int1ucncc over the desires of an elected 
school board. 
At first blush, anti-union scholars might be satisfied that the 
33. (;n:sham Crc1dc Teachers Ass'n v. (;rcsham Grade Sch. Dist. No.4, 630 1'.2d 1304 
(Or. Ct. App. l<JXI J. 
34. Medin, supn1 note I, at 13X6. 
35. This ahilitv has important consequences with respect to the "paradox" efkct, 
discussed Jidi:J .. ~(·c 1d. at 13<) I. 
36. 5(·c. e.g., Malin & Kerchner, supr:l note 30, at <Jl4 (litigation over subjects of 
bc1rgaining across st.\tes is an "cKl hoc approach that bcks predictclbility cmd encourages 
litigJrion"). 
37. Appeal of White Mountain Keg'! Sch. Dist., <JOX A.2d 7<)0 (N.H. 2006) (stJtc 
supreme court holding thJt tcJcher evJiuJtions is Jt kJst cl permissive subject of bc1rgaining .md 
if parties do bargain on the issue during negotiations, thev arc bound to that agreement. The 
court declined to rule on the question of whether the issue is mandator\'). Sec :dw Ass'n of 
l'ortsmomh Teachcrs/NEA-NH v. l'orrsmotJth Sch. Dist., Dec No. 200X-02S (N.H. l'ub. 
Emp. Labor Relations Bd.) (feb IS, 200X) (impact bc1rgaining of teacher evaluation is J 
mandatory su bjcct of bargaining, provided unions do not .lttempt to control the process). 
3X. Sec lvblin, supr:l note I, clt 13X7 (noting tlut different courts have variouslv 
cbssificd cbss size, school ulcndar, drug testing, among other issues). 
3<J. .~(·c, e.g., Aberdeen Educ. Ass'n v. Aberdeen Bd. of Educ., 215 N.W.2d X37, X41 
(S.D. I <)74) (prohibiting bargaining over teacher preparation periods, teacher con!Crcnce 
scheduling, :md usc of instructional aides on the grounds that negotiations should nor intcrkrc 
with the duties of elected representatives). A New Hampshire statlltc expresses the lcgisbti\'l· 
sentiment on this issue. A prohibited subject of barg:1ining is one that t:llls under a "mamgcrial 
policv exception." N.H. REV. STAT. AN~. § 273-A: I (XI) (2011) (this term "shall be 
construed to include but shc1ll not be limited to the timctions, programs ami methods of the 
public cmplovcr, including the usc of tcclmology, the public cmpluvcr\ organizational 
structure, c111d the selection, direction and number of its personnel, so c1s to continue public 
e<>ntn>l ofg<>vcrnmental hmctiuns"). 
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majority of states profiled in this Article now prohibit bargaining 
over teacher evaluations. This appears to be good news. In theory, 
management can unilaterally implement reforms without union input 
or obstacles. However, as discussed in the f(>llowing section, the 
exclusion of unions may not have the intuitive ctkct of improving 
teacher evaluations and, ultinutely, teacher quality. It may actually 
become more difficult. 
D. The Paradox oFPublic Sector Barg;uin.ng in Teacher Evaluation 
A paradox exists in public sector labor bargaining when courts or 
legislan1rcs seck exclusive control over a bargaining subject, such as 
teacher cvaluations.40 On its bee, this prohibition would seem to 
improve the democratic cflcct of negotiations because its gives 
almost exclusive discretion to the elected school board. However, 
when unions arc excluded, they f(xus their resources on blocking the 
implementation of rd(>rms through the mechanisms available to 
thcm.41 Thus, regulations meant to tighten the link between elected 
otlicials and policy actually work to weaken them. 
The f(>llowing example illustrates the paradoxical dlcct. A school 
board may contemplate increasing the length of a school day. During 
subsequent negotiations, unions f(>eus on bargaining "the bread and 
butter" issues relative to the subjcct,42 devoting energy and resources 
to discussions concerning overtime compensation or the exact length 
of the extended day and not the content of the policy or program. In 
this way, they can undermine proposed or imposed rcf(>rm. The 
policy can die by "a death of a thousand cuts." However, this is the 
essential point: union exclusion from developing policy that atlccts 
employment promotes union ctl(>rts to exert influence over the issue 
through other means, such as impact bargaining. The practical cflcct 
is that the policy is undercut and cfl(>rts by elected school boards arc 
frustrated. Paradoxically, the hoped-for democratic cflCct IS 
diminished-not enhanced-by excluding unions from bargaining. 
I Iowcvcr, there is ~1 solution. Indeed, greater--not less-
involvement by unions in policy-crafting promotes dcmocracy.43 
Union involvement can pay particular rewards if it begins when 
40. Mellin, supr:1 note I. 
41. !d. 
42. !d. at 1390. 
43. !d. at 1391. 
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discussion of an issue first takes placc.44 In other words, when unions 
have "some skin in the game" from the start, they arc invested in the 
policy's success. They can also f(xus their cff()rts on the merits of the 
policy. In the end, this assists management in implementing a policy 
with less union resistance. Malin argues that "It I here is good reason 
to believe th~lt g1vmg employees, through their unions, an 
institutional voice in the initial decision making will increase the 
likelihood that they will become agents of~ instead of obstructions to, 
dkctive ch~mge."4S 
Research in psychology and human resource management, as 
well as literature in education professional development support this 
position.46 The professional development liter~lhlrc takes the position 
that teachers must be active agents in rd(ml1 and that policy 
implemented through top-down management is doomed f()r 
hilure.47 Thus, research in psychology and education support the 
contention that more union inclusion in the policy development of 
teacher evaluations may be the key to implementing rd(mn with 
respect to teacher evaluations.4X 
Significantly, Malin identified the paradox bcfhrc these most 
recent amendments regarding teacher evaluations took dkct.49 A Lnv 
and policy analysis using this lens is more critical than ever, given the 
recent change of events. If there is a paradox dkct, prohibiting 
negotiations over teacher evaluations may undercut legislative dt()rts 
to improve teacher evaluations. Consequently, alternatives to the 
wholesale exclusion of unions in teacher evaluations ought to be 
examined. 
44. /d. 
45. ld 
46. M;llin, supr;I note I, at 1391-'!2. Sec e.g., judith Littk, !'rok,sionil rc;trning ;tnd 
School Nctll'ork Tics: l'rwpcct,· fin· School Improvement, 6 j. Enuc. CIIA:-\l;E 277, 277-2'!1 
(2005). 
47. l.ittk, supra note 46. 
4X. !d Sec ;i/m M,llin, supr;I note I, at I "'!S-1 "97 (highlighting mtmerous exampks 
where unions ;\1\d matugement have collaborated). 
4'!. M.1lin\ The l'aradox ofl'uhlic Sector Li/){}r Lm· was published in 200'!. 5/x note 
I, suj>U. The amendments to collective bargaining statutes thar impacted teacher evaluation 
rook place, ti>r the most part, after that. Sec, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 111.70-111.77 (2011) 
(;\mended through Act 10 of the 2011 Wisconsin LegislatutT). Sec ;i/m jason Stein er ;tl., 
Wilker Stj:ns Ht"~"ct Hill, r<;":Ii (/t;i/lmgcs }vfount, joURNAL SENTJ:-.JEI. (M,lr II, 20 II), 
http:/ jwww. jsonline .com/news/statepolitics/1177'!X I "3.html (documenting (;ovemor 
W.1lkn\ signing of Act I 0 in March of 20 II). 
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III. NARROWING THE SCOPE: CHANGES TO COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING LAWS FROM SELECTED STATES 
This section discusses recent changes to collective bargaining and 
education st~ltutes that impact union involvement in teacher 
cv~1luations. To discuss the recent changes, this section will profile 
four states: Wisconsin, Horida, Michigan, and New Hampshire. The 
first three states now prohibit negotiations over the process and 
substance of teacher evaluations, so whereas in the t(mrth state 
negotiations arc permitted. s 1 New Hampshire's classification system 
is discussed because it may provide a legal framework to promote the 
effective and democratic implemcnt~1tion of teacher evaluations. 52 
A. Wisnmsin 
In March of 20 ll, the Wisconsin legislature amended its 
collective bargaining statute-the Municipal Employee Relations Act 
("MERA")-through the "Budget Repair BiiJ."S3 Despite vocal 
opposition from public sector unions, including teachers, and court 
challcngcs,54 the measure p<lsscd and became ctlcctivc in June of 
2011. ss The bill altered labor-management relations in significant 
ways.S6 In particular, the scope of issues subject to bargaining was 
drastically narrowed to one. The applicable statute, as amended, 
reads: 
SO. WIS. STAT. § 111.70(4J(mb) (2011) (Wisconsin st;ltutc prohibiting bargaining 
over an1·thing but hc1sc wages); FLA. STAT.§ 1012.34(1)(a) (2011) (Florida stature giving 
district superintendent exclusive control over teachn evaluations); MICII. COM!'. L1\WS § 
423.21 S( 3) (I) ( 20 II) (Michigcm statute prohibiting bargaining over teacher evcduations). New 
I Llmpshirc\ public sector bargaining statutes docs contain similar prohibitions. N.H. REV. 
STi\T. A:\N. § 273-A:I ctSC<J. (2011). 
S I .~(·c supr:znotc 37. 
S2. .~(·c discussion Iizli:z Part IV where a two-tier solution to the paradox is 
ITC<JI111llended. 
S3. WIS. SLIT.§§ 111.70-111.77 (2011 ). 
S4. .Si:c, e.g., John Nichols, vViq·onsin /ll<~t.;c Rules W:zlkcr\- Anti-Lzhor Lzw "Null :11/d 
!'oid," TilE NATJO:--.: (Sept. 12, 2012 ), http://www.rhenation.com/blogjl6<Jl)6X/wisconsin-
judge-rulcs-wcllkcrs-anti-lab<>r-Llw-null-and-void# (cl<>eumcnting union pn>tests and court 
challenges to collective bargaining law changes). 
SS. Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, Act 10 § 24S (codified at WIS. STAT. § 
111. 70(4 )(mb) (20 II)) (prohibiting bargaining over anv subject other than total base wages). 
S6. ,kc, e.g., WIS. STAr. § 111.70(3g) (2011) (prohibiting em plovers ti-om 
withholding union dues). 
lJ APPLYING THE "PARADOX" THEORY 
l'rohihitcd subjects o(harg;zining 
The municipal employer is prohibited from bargaining colkctivdy 
with ~l collective harg~1ining unit containing a general municipal 
employee with respect to any of the t(Jllowing: 
I. Am· hcror or omdition or cmp/(~vmcnt except wages, which 
includes onlv total base wages and excludes any other 
compens~nion, which includes, hut is not limited to, overtime, 
premium pay, merit pay, pert(mlunce pay, supplemental 
compensation, pay schedules, ~md automatic pay progressions. S7 
Because only "total base wages" arc negotiable, tC<Khcr 
evaluations arc now a prohibited subject of bargaining.sx Even if 
111<1nagcmcnt wants to discuss teacher evaluations with the union 
during negotiations, it is prohibited from doing so.59 
The reclassification of teacher evaluations changes prior law and 
pr<Kticc. Indeed, bd(xc 2011, ccrt<lin clements of teacher evaluations 
were negotiable. for example, usc of student achievement scores in 
evaluations was a mandatory subject of bargaining.60 Assistance 
offered to underperforming teachers, such as professional growth 
plans or professional development, was also once a permissive subject 
of barg<1ining. 61 However, Wisconsin currently prohibits negotiation 
regarding il11_!' component of a teacher evaluation system. Thus, a 
school board can elect to include an evaluation system that includes 
student perfC:mnancc on standardized tests without consulting the 
Ul11011. 
In place of local negotiations, the state Department of Public 
Instruction ("DPI") has assumed a prominent role in teacher 
evaluations. 62 Recently, D PI convened a task f(xcc that issued 
S7. !d § 111.70(4)(mh) (emplusis added). 
sx. 1d 
S9. Adherence to this exclusion m<lY he awkward in <l practiul sense. Simply as a nuttn 
of good practice, <ldministration and teachers discuss evaluation procedures and requirements. 
At what poim might organic discussions between managemem and reachers concerning 
n·aluatiom 1:!11 into "negotiations"1 Moreover, how would such a violation he ent(>rced1 If 
discussions wem too br, would nun<lgcmcnt threaten to tile an unbir labor practice ag<linst the 
union> The unimended consequences of this arc unclear. 
60. Wis. STAT.§§ I IX.22S, 111.70(2)(o) (2009). 
61. Beloit Educ Ass'n v. Wis. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 242 N.W.2d 231 (Wis. 
1976). 
62. WIS. FRAMEWORK !'OR EllUCATOR EITF<:TIVFKESS, PREL!tv\1:--JAR Y REPORT & 
RECOM,\IE:'-Jili\TIONS (2011), <li'<JJ!ah/c <It 
http://cc.dpi. wi.g<l\'/iiksjec/pdf/ee _report_prclim.pdf I herein<lher l'RFI ,L\I!Ni\R Y RFI'< JRT I 
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recommendations regarding teacher evaluations f()r districts. 63 
Student perf(mnance is a centerpiece of teacher evaluations under the 
recommendations.64 In fKt, the task f()rce explicitly adopts value-
added modeling ("V AM") as ~l means to measure teacher 
eftcctiveness.65 As discussed later in this section, V AM is 
controversial. In brief~ V AM purports to statistically measure a 
teacher's contribution to a student's individual growth, primarily by 
measuring student scores on standardized tests.66 The notion is that a 
teacher's contribution to a shldent's learning can be statistically 
isolated_67 The Wisconsin task f()rce "recommends" that at least 50(J1J 
of a teacher's evaluation be derived from student assessments, such as 
standardized test scores. 
H. Hmidz 
Like Wisconsin, florida law now prohibits bargaining over 
teacher evaluations.61l By virtue of recent statutory amendments, 
development and implementation of teacher evaluations is now 
vested exclusively with the superintendent of a district. The 
~1pplicable stahJte now reads: 
For the purposes of increasing student learning growth by 
improving the quality of instructional, administrative, and 
supervisory services in the public schools of the state, the district 
school superintendent shall establish procedures for evaluating the 
pert(mnance of duties and responsibilities of all instructional, 
administrative, and supervisory personnel employed by the school 
district. 69 
63. To be sUIT, state union organizations were parr of the task t(>rce, along with a 
myricld of other stclkeholdcrs. Howen:r, this inclusion docs not obviate the need f(>r local 
involvement in teacher evaluations. 
64. 5(·e i'RFI.IM!Ni\R Y REPORT, Sllj)J;znotc 62. 
65. 5(·e 1d. at 6. 
66. William L. Sanders & Sandra 1'. Hom, Research 1-iizdings limn the J(·nnessee 
!":due-Added 
Assnsmcnt St:,tcm (TVAAS) /)atah:zse: fmplicwims lin· h'duczrimul 
F!·;z/u.wim ;znd Rcscczrch, 12 ).l'ERS. EVAI.UATIO:\ EllUC. 247 (l'l'lll). 
67. /d. 
61l. I lowcvcr, unlike in Wisconsin, the lcgislarivc acrivitv occurred prinurilv in the .u-ca 
of the state's education code, not in its labor rclatiot\s stature. Regardless, the dkct is rhc same 
in both stares. 
69. FIASTAT.Si 1012.34(l)(a)(2011). 
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Making the superintendent the sole keeper of evaluation 
procedures is a shift in policy in florida. Prior to the mactmcnt of 
the above statute, unions and management negotiated teacher 
evaluations as a mandatory subJ'cct of bargaining. 70 
• L L 
State control over teacher evaluations, therd(>rc, has increased. 
Indeed, the Florida legislature prescribed essential components of the 
teacher evaluation system, notwithstanding the superintendent's 
duties. Law requires that district evaluation policies usc student 
pcrf(m11~mcc and the controversial V AM in determining teacher 
dkctivcncss. 71 Indeed, at least half of a pcrf(>rmancc evaluation must 
be based on "student learning growth" as measured by state or 
district asscssmcnts.72 Moreover, the state mandates th~lt districts 
create a salary schedule to link teachers' s~1larics to their perf(>rmance 
on the new teacher evaluation systcm.73 Ultimately, the state 
Dcp~lrtmcnt of Education oversees each district's evaluation plan.74 
In sum, like Wisconsin, florida's new law governing teacher 
evaluations dkctivcly precludes union involvement. Teacher 
evaluation policies and procedures arc expressly reserved f(>r the 
superintendent. Additionally, the state legislature requires that any 
evaluation system developed at the local level must include the usc of 
student test scores. 7S 
C Michigan 
In 2011, the Michigan legislature prohibited teacher evaluation 
bargaining. The applicable statute reads as t(JIIows: 
70. The Florida Education Association (a N EA affiliate) Ius tiled suit challenging the 
constitmionality of the new evaluation system. The Association argues thclt the system 
intcrkrcs with Florida\ Constitution, which guarantees employees the right to bargain over 
wages, hours, and conditions of emplovment. Sec Complaint tin· lkcbratorv c\Ild Injunctive 
Relief, Robinson v. Robinson (Ha. Cir. Ct. 2011) (No. 2011 CA2S26), ;zv.u/;zh/c ;zr 
http://www .mC\Trbn ">kslaw .c< >m/ d< >euments/ R< >hi 1 IS< >11% 20vs ')-(,20 R< >hi liS< m/ 
Robinson_ v_ Robinson_ Complaim.pdf (last visited December S, 20 II) I hereinc1ti:er 
Complaint 1-
71. I'IA STAT.§ 1012.34(3) (2011 ). ScCJd § 1012.22. 
72. !d.§ 1012.34(3)(a) (emphasis added). 
73. !d § 1012.22(1)(c)(S). 
74. !d § 1012.34(1 )(b). 
7S. lmporuntlv, the federal government played the role of the not-so-invisible lund in 
l'loridcl; the new evaluation and compensation timnulas were developed in connection with 
Floricb\ Race to the Top grant. FI.A. DFI''T Of' EllUC., RFVIEW AND APPROVAl. CIIECki.IST 
f'OR RTTT TEACIIFR EVAI.UATIO:--: SYSTEMS (20 II), c!Vclll!hlc cit 
http:/ jwww. tld< >e.< >rg/clrr<l( I 'ecJCher E \'<\ lm ti< mSvsrems.c1sp. 
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Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a 
bargaining representative of its employees shall not include ~my of 
the following subjects: 
Decisions about the development, content, standards, procedures, 
adoption, and implementation of a public school employer's 
perfi:n-mance evaluation system . . . , decisions concerning the 
content of pcrfim1unce evaluation of an employee . . . , or the 
impact of those decisions on an individual employee or the 
bargaining unit. 76 
The legislature also cn~Ktcd several other laws that impact teacher 
evaluations. 
Like florida, Michigan law now requires the usc of V AM in 
teacher evaluations. 77 Indeed, "student growth" must be a 
"significant Elctor" in individual pcrf(mnancc evaluations. n Student 
growth is defined by statute in value-added tcrms?9 Districts must 
develop a compensation plan that accounts t()r teacher 
pcrt()rmancc.XO Additionally, teacher pcrf()rmancc is the "nujority 
LKtor" in making RIF dccisions.X 1 Length of service cannot be 
considered. In sum, teachers arc excluded from bargaining in some of 
the most important and consequential areas aflccting their working 
conditions: how they arc evaluated and rewarded f()r their job. 
This was a remarkable hlrn of events in Michigan, as teacher 
evaluations had previously been a mandatory subject of bargaining. X2 
Moreover, as in Florida, in place of local solutions, the state passed 
highly prescriptive laws concerning the content and usc of 
evaluations. X3 However, the process and substance of a teacher 
76. M!Cil. COM!'. LAWS~ 423.215(3)(1) (2011) (emphasis added). 
77. 20 II Mich. Pub. Acts 102 (codified at MICII. CoM!'. LAW~ 1249( I )(c) (20 II)). 
7X. !d 
79. ld (ddining student growth as measured bv national, state, and district test LbU or 
other objective criteria). 
XO. !:'lorida and Michigan otkr a subtle comparison with respect to the usc of student 
perlt>n1UJKe in teacher evaluations. In !:'lorida, student perf(mnancc must ,\ccount h>r 'lt least 
50'Yt> of a teacher evaluation plan. 
XI. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 102 (codified at MICII. COM!'. L'\W ~ 124X(I)(b)(i) 
(2011)). 
X2. Cent. Mich. liniv. Faculty Ass'n v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 273 N.W.2d 21 (Mich. 
197X) (tinding an unbir labor practice when university unilatcrallv adopted ev<1luation 
procedures rhat added student evaluations as a bctor t(>r teacher eflcetivencss beCJuse it was a 
mandatory subject of bargaining). 
X3. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 102 (coditicd ar MICII. CoM!'. LAW ~~ 124X-49 (2011)) 
(requiring teacher peli(>rmance as a bctor in bvoff decisions and setting the substance of 
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evaluation is pcrmissivc.X4 Importantly, teacher evaluations' impact 
on wages, hours, and terms of employment is likely mambtory. xs 
The state's Labor Bo~1rd stated that "if the implementation of the 
unilaterally, non-negotiated evaluation program impacts the terms 
and conditions of evaluations then there must be negotiations about 
this change to those terms and conditions of cmploymcnt."X6 
Because the impact remains mandatory, it might be suggested that 
the situation is ripe fc:>r unions to undermine implementation of a 
teacher evaluation policy, pursuant to the par~1dox dlcct. X7 
D. New I l;zmpshirc 
A decision set forth bv the New Hampshire Public Employee 
Labor Relations Board ("PELRB") strikes the proper balance f<>r 
union involvement and management control. In A.~:mo:ztion o{ 
Portsmouth/NbA -NH t'. Port~mouth School ])iwict, PELRB 
established important checks and balances on unions and 
simultaneously encouraged management to involve unions. XX U ndcr 
this dccision,X<J management need not bargain with unions when 
negotiations over evaluations do any of the f(>llowing: 
( l) Restrict the int(mnation the district considers; 
( 2) Set the standards the district will apply in evaluating employees; 
( 3) Control the district's actions with the evaluations; 
( 4) Address changes the district needs to implement to the 
ev~1luation; or 
tcKhcr pcrl(mnancc evaltution to include student growth data). 
X4. Appeal of White Mountain Reg'! Sch. Dist., <JOX A.2d 7<JO, 7')5 (N.I I. 2006 ); In rc 
Pittslidd Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 5<J4, 5<J6-<J7 (I <J<J<J). 
HS. Con-Val Educ. Ass'n v. Con-V.tl Sch. Dist., Dec. 2000-116 (N.H. Pub. Emp. 
Ltbor RcLttions Bd.) (Nov. S, 2000). 5(·c ;i/m Appeal of N.H., 647 A.2d 1302, 1306-07 
(N.H. I<J<J4) (although deciding to otter extracurricular programs is the district's mamgerial 
prerog.tti\T, "wages, hours, and other specifics of stall' obligations ;tnd remuneration primarily 
ath:ct the terms ;tnd conditions of employment.") 
X6. Con-Val Educ. Ass'n v. Con-V.tl Sch. Dist., Ike. 2000-116 (N.H. Pub. Emp. 
Ltbor Rdation.s Bd.) (Nov. S, 2000). 
X7. Malin, supr.1 note I. 
XX. Ass'n of Portsmouth Tcachers/NFA-NH v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 200X-
025 (N.H. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd.) (Feb 15, 200X). 
X<J. Of course, administr.ttivc decisions arc not precedenti;tl. Regardless, this is the 
current state of th<" bw in New Hampshin:. Moreover, the author contends that this decision 
has struck ;til importam babtH"<' in terms of limiting union ability to imp;tct bargain over 
reacher evalu.ttions while ;tt the same time encouraging the union to dunnd th<"ir efti1rts ;tnd 
resources to\\'ard the merits of the policv, rath<"r tlun its emplovment consequences. 
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( 5) Address the nature of evaluators' personnel contact or 
observation of employeesY0 
[2013 
The PortmJOuth decision places significant limitations on a 
union's ability to undermine teacher evaluations through impact 
bargaining. Indeed, the usc of evaluation results with respect to 
employment decisions remain under management discretion, given 
the restrictions set f(>rth in Portmwuth. The district has unfettered 
discretion in terms of the inf(>rmation that it may consider. Thus, 
unions cmnot usc bargaining simply to protect employee rights. 
Stripped of this ability, unions must, thcrcf(>rc, address the merits of 
the issue. 
Malin suggests that this type of involvement will avoid the 
paradox.'" If unions make thoughtful proposals, management must 
negotiate proposals to the extent that terms and working conditions 
arc atlCctcd.<J2 The legal framework tlmncls union cfl(>rts toward 
positive involvement in teacher evaluations. It channels union cft(>rts 
into positive rcf(m11, rather than simply protectionist strategies. 
E. Putt1i1g It All Together: Trends· and Pofi(y Implications 
Several trends emerged in the states analyzed in this Article. 
These arc identified below, along with their policy implications. 
first, the paradox of public sector labor is perpetuated by the recent 
amendments concerning teacher evaluations and bargaining in the 
states examined (with the exception of New I lampshirc). Wisconsin, 
florida, and Michigan have all excluded unions from bargaining the 
issue at the local level. Consequently, unions will f(xus on protecting 
employees' rights rather than education rcf(>rm and the improvement 
of schools.<J3 This may occur through impact bargaining (where 
applicable) or other means, such as increased litig~ltion_'.l4 
The effects arc already evident. The florida National Education 
Association ("NEA") has challenged the various amendments 
concerning the collective bargaining rights of teachers, including 
those related to teacher evaluations. NEA argues that these 
amendments violate a state constitutional right to bargain.% 
90. Ass/1 o!Porwnouth Tcnha1, Ike. No. 200X-025. 
91. Malin, supr;~notc I, at 1391. 
92. !d. 
93. Sccp,mcnJ!IJ- 1d. 
94. !d 
9S. Complaint, .\1/f't:l note 70. Sec ;Jim Kcyonna Summers, Two l'Ii1<-lbs loduc;Jton 
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Rdkcting the paradox theory, NEA has channeled its energy into 
dismantling the lcgislation.<J6 This is precisely the opposite result 
needed if effective teacher evaluation rd(xm is to be 
implemcntcd'J7 -an unintended consequence of excluding unions 
from teacher evaluation discussions. 
Second, these amendments ~liter the dvnamics of 
intergovernmental power. State-level government now plays a more 
active role in the process and substance of teacher evaluations. Of 
course, this varies in terms of degree. The New Hampshire and 
Wisconsin Dcp~lrtmcnts of Education have made "recommendations" 
f(>r tc~Khcr cv~lluations. Horida and Michigan have mambtcd that a 
teacher cvalu~ltion process include certain clements, such as the usc of 
V AM. However, state requirements on localities may very well be 
unfunded mandates. Moreover, the not-so-invisible hand of federal 
influence over this power shift cannot be understated. In florida and 
Michigan, changes to teacher evaluation were prompted explicitly by 
those states' pursuit of Race to the Top (" R TTT") fundsYX 
Third, these amendments do not address the larger problems 
associated with the current state of teacher evaluations. The primary 
issue is how administrators E1il to usc teacher evaluation systems 
properly. Indeed, administrators' misapplication of cxis·ting 
evaluation systems explains many problems with improving teacher 
qu~1liryY<J A recent policy brief noted that 73% of teacher evaluations 
did not contain recommendations t(x improvcmcnt. 1 00 Moreover, 
Amoni.: JlJose J:zktizg on New Texher f"l';//1/;/tion Lzw, Ti\,vll'i\ BAY TL\1FS (Ocr. I 0, 20 II), 
h rrp: / jwww. tam paha \' .C< >m/nt>ws/ 
cducation/tcachns/;lrtidc II <J60 14.eLT (profiling the dulkngc of six educators and l'loriLb 
N EA to teKher e\·aluation changes). 
<J6. Summers, supt:znotc <JS. 
<J7. Malin, supr.z note I, at 13')3 (noting the successhil impkmcnt;ltion of innovative 
teacher e\'aluation svstems where unions ha\'e ;\ voict> in the process). 
<JX. .S(·e, e.g., Ha. lkp't of Educ., hnzl .s(·ope ot' Work TempLzte, RACE TO Tl!E To!' 
(;R.\1\:T AR< '!liVE, http://www.tldoe.org/arrajRacnotht>Top-archi\'c.asp (last \'isited Dec. 22, 
2012) ( n< >ting that Horida had met riK requirt>nKnt of rd(>rming its teacher evaluation system 
to s;1tisfv riK rcquiremems of the RTIT grams) .. Six ;z/w Mich. Educ. Ass'n, New 
RC<JIIirement,· fi JJ' Tczcher l:'v;z/iutions, 
http://www .nK;l.< >rg/pd/cntiticltionfnew_ e\';lluation_rt>quiremcms.html (last \'isited I )cc. 22, 
2012) (noting th;\t the re;lson t(>r legislative changt>s to the evaluatio11 S\'stem W;ls t(>r 
Michiga11's RTTT gr;mt.). 
<J<J. S<·e, e.g., Mark Paige, Texher Fvaluation Rcfimn: Finding the h>rest Through the 
Trees, TENIIERS Coli.. REc. (2011), 
http:/ fwww .ru-cn >rd.org/( :, mtent.asp1< :om,-mld = 16SX2. 
100. Da11icl Weisberg cr ;ll., llze Wi<{t;ct Ffkct, TilE N~"WTEACIIERS l'ROIF<:T (200<J), 
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according to teachers, of evaluations containing recommendations, 
only 45% of the recommendations were usd1!1. 101 This is because 
administrators tend to look to evaluations when they arc considering 
employment termination and not the improvement of a teacher's 
individual capacity. 102 Such consequences call into question the 
wisdom of state legislatures developing prescriptive procedures and 
policies for administrators. furthermore, there is no evidence 
suggesting that administr~ltors will abide by the prcscnpnvc 
procedures set fiJrth by the legislature. As noted above, 
administrators tend to ignore the evaluation process. 103 Thus, a 
tlmdamcntal issue with implementing dlcctive teacher evaluations is 
not so much the appropriate system or data (e.g., whether to include 
V AM or not), but the human application of evaluations. 
hnally, the usc of V AM-employed in Wisconsin, florida, <ll1d 
Michigan-is riddled with problems. YAM has been described as a 
way to statistically isolate the dlcct of a teacher on a student's growth 
over the course of time. I 04 The validity of V AM models is 
questionable and has engendered a serious debate among scholars. 
Indeed, many argue that V AM models cannot account for the myriad 
of demographic and social variables (e.g., poverty) that atkct student 
achicvement. 1 05 Because of this, many caution against the usc of 
V AM in high-stakes issues like employment termination. 106 Yet the 
lcgislahJres profiled here have largely ignored these warnings with 
their prescriptive ~1mcndmcnts. Instead, they have f()isted V AM on 
local districts, leaving districts to sort out the complications. Such 
disregard may lead to suspicion over the integrity of the evaluative 
process and, potentially, more litigation. 
IV. A WAY OUTCWTHE PARADOX 
This section recommends a two-tiered approach to escape the 
par~HJox and improve teacher evaluations. first, it suggests that 
;W;zi!:Jhlc ;zt http://widgctctkct.org/. 
101. ld 
102. !d 
I 03. /d. 
I 04. Sanders & Horn, Sllf>J:znote 66, at 247-256. 
I 05. Xiaoxia A. Newton et a!., \/;z/uc-;zddcd Jt1odcliJ~f; o{ Tcxhcr Ffli:crilnJc.\s: An 
h:IJ'for;ltl(m o(Su!>Jlitr Aoo.1s Jlfodc/1· ;znd ()mtcxt,·, Ell. l'oL'Y ARC! liVES (Sept. 10, 20 I 0 ), 
;z 1 ;zj/;zZ,/c .It http://cpaa.asu.edu/ojs/ article/view /X I 0. 
I 06. Hc.nhcr Hill, Fl·;z/u;ning Value Added ,H{)(k-1\: A Vzlidin· A1gumcnt AJ'f'ro;zch, 2X 
).l'oL'Y A:--.:ALYSIS & Mc;MT. 6'J2, 700-709 (2009). 
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jurisdictions adopt a legal framework that incorporates union 
involvement in tC<Khcr evaluations. New Hampshire law might be a 
useful framework t<>r incorporating union involvement in teacher 
evaluations, <1S it succcsstldly balances ma1ugcmcnt prcrog<1tivcs 
while channeling union energy in a positive manner. Second, <1 
structural framework that t<>sters mutual collaboration must <1lso exist 
<1t the local level. Employing IBB can cflcctuatc this. This non-
tradition<11 appnuch to negotiation can be an cfkctive means of 
building rcbtionships and collaboration so that rcf(>rms can be 
promoted rather than undermined by unions. 
A. A tm(!IiJg the Paradox Through ;J Legal Structure 
An appropriate legal structure is <1 necessary precondition f(>r 
<Woiding the paradox. 107 This legal structure must be guided by 
several important principles, giving employees a collective and 
institutio1ul voice in the proccss. 10X It should <11low unions and 
teachers to share the risk of any policy.I09 It should channel union 
efforts in a positive manner. In sum, employees should be invested in 
the final policy product.ll O 
One obvious legal solution may be classifying teacher evaluations 
as a mandatory subject of bargaining. This, of course, comes with 
risk t(>r management. School districts may rightly tear that simply 
making the topic mandatory will only open the door f(x unions to be 
even more vigibnt in erecting obstacles to implementation. This is a 
hir criticism. No doubt there arc unions that will usc such a structure 
to the advantage of their employees and not schools or students. Ill 
There may be a way around the paradox by making teacher 
cvalll<ltions permissive and not mandatory, as is the case in New 
llampshire. 
The New Hampshire legal framework militates against the 
"paradox of public bbor law."ll2 Indeed, it pushes management and 
I 07. Malin, supo note I, at I 39:-l (noting that the legal structure make' .1 difference in 
clunncling cfl(>rt' in a positive nunncr). 
lOX. !d. at 1391. 
I 09. !d. 
I 10. !d. 
II I. !d. at 139:-l (noting that there will alwavs be unions who will u'e the legal structure 
to "obstruct the government entitv's mission"). 
112. !d. .tt 1393 ("Whn1 the union serves as .1 vehicle t<>r collective emplovee \'OilT in the 
eLtltution ctnd discipline of cmplovecs, the union em be transt(>rmed from an impediment of 
cfl(xtin· gm·crnmcnt imo a contributor."). 
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unions together to bargain teacher evaluations. first of all, the law 
permits bargaining of the subjcct.II3 Moreover, the law encourages 
management to exercise this option because impact bargaining of 
teacher evaluation is mandatory. from management's perspective, it 
would be inefficient to construct a teacher evaluation system only to 
sec it undermined through union impact bargaining, which is ~l likely 
occurrence when unions arc excluded from the initial discussions of a 
policy. 114 The more prudent route is for both sides to engage at the 
beginning of the proccss.II5 
Indeed, the law encourages such an approach, especially on the 
part of unions. This is primarily because of the limitations set forth in 
the Portsmouth Labor Board dccision. 11 6 Such limitations create a 
disincentive f()r unions to overreach through impact bargaining. If 
they do, they run the risk of management being able to shut them 
out completely. As discussed, unions cannot do any of the f()llowing: 
"seck to restrict" inf()rmation the district will consider; "set the 
standards" the district will usc; "control" the action the district may 
take with an evaluation; address any changes in the policy that the 
district nuy "need" to make; or address the "nature and extent" of 
contact or observation of employccs. 11 7 Thus, unions would be wise 
to engage in discussions at the development phase of the evaluation 
discussions, rather than play defense through impact barg~1ining 
under these restrictions. 
In sum, New Hampshire law provides a usdid platf(H·m f()r 
management and unions to f()rmally construct teacher cv~1luations 
through negotiations. It sets a necessary condition to prevent the 
paradox of public sector bargaining from arising with respect to 
teacher evaluation rcfc:>rm. An appropriate legal framework sets 
f:worablc circumstances f()r collaboration.Illl More is required, 
however. Unions and management must trust one another and both 
be invested in the final product of any negotiations, whether f(m1ul 
or infi:mnal. Thus, the conditions at the bargaining table must 
113. Appeal of White Moumain Reg'l Seh. Dist., 901l A.2d 790,795 (N.H. 2006); In rc 
l'ittslield Sch. Dist., 744 A.2d 594, 596-97 (I 999). 
114. M.11in, supra note I, clt 1370. 
115. !d. at 1391 (giving institutional voice in the initd decision-making increases the 
chances that unions become "agems of change"). 
116. Ass'n of Portsmouth Teaehers/NEA-NH v. Portsmouth Sch. Dist., Dec. No. 2001l-
025 (N.H. Pub. Emp. Labor Relations Bd.) (feb 15, 2001l). 
117. !d. 
!Ill. Malin, sup1~1 note I, at l39H. 
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cncour~1gc both sides in this direction. To do this, an alternative to 
the typical "horse trading" type of b<lrgaining should be explored. 
H. Intcrcst-IJ;zscd Barpuiui1g: A Solution to rhc Ru:zdox ;It the Local 
Len_'/ 
IBB, an innovative approach to bargaining, may be the 
appropriate mechanism for bargaining teacher evaluations at the 
ground lcvcl. 119 IBB tixuscs on building relationships through 
ncgoti~uions. 12o It recognizes that parties to a negotiated agreement 
must live and work under that agreement. Thus, the bargaining 
process should t()stcr positive relationships between union ~md 
management. It stands in contrast to traditional "positional 
b~1rgaining that can be hostile to education rd(xm."l2I 
I BB t(Kuscs negotiations on the merits of an issue. I 22 Through 
negotiations, it identifies the issues to be discussed. It sets objective 
criteria to measure solutions to the issue. Both parties brainstorm 
possible solutions to the issue. This ditkrs from typical positional 
bargaining, where each side attempts to maximize its interest at the 
expense of the other. IBB suggests that both parties should jointly 
resolve shared problems. In this way, labor-management relations arc 
enhanced through the bargaining process. 
An cx~1mplc of IBB applied in district negotiations might be as 
follows. I 23 Management may bring to the table the issue of adopting 
or rdim11ing the district's teacher evaluation process. Management 
and unions would jointly establish objective criteria to measure 
I j<)_ .~(-c, c,g,, B,\RRY BLUESTONE & Ti!Wv!AS KOCIIAN, TOII'AR!l :\ NE\\' GIUNil 
B.\Rl;Al~: COLL\IHlRXI'I\'E AI'PROACIIFS TO L\BOR-MAN:\ld-:,\1ENT RFFORM 1:\ 
MASSAU!l!SFITS (20 I I), .ll':lll.z/>lc ;It http://www,northeastern_cdujdukakiscentcr/wp-
c<mtcnt/upl<>adsjl;rand_ Bargain_ Report, pdf (recommt:IKling the ad<>ptions of IBB )-
120_ .~(·c R<K;!',R FISCIIFR & Wli.LIAM lJRY, (;c:niNl; TO YES: NH;OI!XriNl; 
AldZEFME~T WITIIOUT GIV!Nl; It\ (Penguin Books I <JHI ). 
I 21. .kc, <'}!·· DEMITC!II'LL, supr:J note 24 (noting that "I e lducation rdillm must p.1ss 
through the rigors of.1 colkctivc bargaining table in which tr:1dcoffs arc commonplace"). 
122. FIS<IIFR & UR Y, supr.Jnote 120, :It xviii. 
12"- IBB\ guiding principles havt: been described as t<>Ilows. First, negotiators must 
distinguish between the "people" .llld the" problem." Thcv must attend to the human :lSJKct of 
b.1rgaining (e.g., human <:motions) and also, separately, the suhstami1T merit of a probkm. 
Second, negoti.uions must keep an eve on the imcrests of the parties and not simplv their 
positiom. The assumption here is th:1t there may he slured interests that, once rewalcd, kad to 
colkctive solutiom to a given problem. Third, parties must be creative and invcm options to .1 
prohkm. In other words, sides should brainstorm potcmi:ll solutions. In doing so, thcv ma1· 
tind :1 mc.llls to s:!tisi\· their mutual interests. Fourth, all proposals should be measured agaimt 
objectiiT critcri.l. .kc 1d 
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possible solutions. Such criteria might ask whether a proposed 
solution docs any of the following: ( 1) improves tc~Khcr 
effectiveness; (2) is flir to employees; or (3) provides necessary 
resources t(x both management and employees. Both parties would 
brainstorm potential solutions that address the problem and also can 
be measured against these criteria. Thus, management and unions 
would constructively and positively address the problcm.l24 
IBB provides a local roadmap that can complement the right 
legal framework in finding a way out of the paradox. Through IBB, 
both unions and management become invested in an agreement at its 
initial stagcs.l2S IBB helps the parties share the risk. Indeed, through 
IBB, both parties ~1rc central to crafting the final product. IBB also 
promotes relationship-building that might further union and 
management collaboration as teacher evaluations arc implemented. 
Indeed, IBB starts from the premise that negotiations arc a tool in 
creating good relationships, not simply a means to create a contract. 
Thus, IBB acts as a natural complement to a legal framework that 
encourages collaboration, rather than prohibits it. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like blindtc>ldcd partygocrs swmgmg at a piilata, state 
legislatures took multiple swipes at their respective collective 
bargaining laws in 2011. Indeed, with a swift crack, they eviscerated 
the collective bargaining rights of tc~Khcrs. The area of teacher 
evaluations was particularly impacted. In Wisconsin, ~lorida, and 
Michigan, the issue of teacher evaluations is now a prohibited subject 
of bargaining. Conventional wisdom suggests that management is 
now free to implement ctlcctivc teacher evaluation systems and 
rctcmn. Like candy E1lling from the piiiata, teacher cvahution rctc>rm 
is now unencumbered. 
Y ct these changes could undermine teacher evaluation rctcm11. 
Management will have less control over the process, rather than 
more. The paradox of public sector labor law will create this ctlcct. 
As unions and their membership arc excluded from barg~1ining 
teacher evaluations, unions will become more vigilant in protecting 
124. The author recognizes that there arc circumstances where the relationship between 
the parties will not sustain such collaboration and may not be appropriate. 
l2S. l\1,\lin, supra note I, at l3lJl (noting the importance of involving unions in the 
initials phases of policv development so as to avoid the paradox). 
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their employees when management mismanages the evaluation 
system. In other words, the recent reforms with respect to 
evaluations arc backward. 
Going fl:>rward, legislatures would do right to permit 
management and unions to negotiate teacher evaluations. This can be 
done with appropriate constraints to protect against union overreach, 
~1s in New Hampshire. Including teachers will develop employee buy-
in, increase employees' personal investment in job pertl:m1unce, and 
promote labor pe~Ke. In sum, using the hlw to promote more union 
involvement in teacher evaluation discussions makes fl:>r good 
education policy. 
